A Verification Framework for FBD based Software in Nuclear Power Plants

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Abstract

Formal verification of Function Block Diagram (FBD) based software is an essential task when replacing traditional relay-based analog system with PLC-based software in nuclear reactor protection system (RPS). FBD programs are developed manually and revised frequently in process of development. There are a set of properties to be verified formally, which all FBD releases should satisfy. Whenever FBDs are modified, there is also a need to verify behavioral equivalence of subsequently modified FBDs. This paper proposes a software verification framework for FBD software in nuclear power plants. It uses SMV model checker for verifying whether an FBD meets its required properties, and VIS verification system for checking behavioral equivalence between modified FBDs. A case study, conducted using a nuclear power plant shutdown system being developed in Korea, demonstrated that the proposed verification framework is effective and useful.

1. Introduction

Software safety [1] became an important issue for embedded real-time control systems. When verifying safety-critical software, formal methods [2] play critical roles in demonstrating compliance to several regulatory requirements. KNICS [3] project used NuSCR [4], a formal specification language and toolset based on SCR [5,6], to formally specify and verify software requirements for nuclear reactor protection system (RPS) of APR-1400 nuclear power reactor. Formal verification techniques such as model checking [7, 8] were also used to verify critical system properties [21].

PLCs (Programmable Logic Controllers) are widely used to implement safety-critical control software, and IEC [9] defined five programming languages as international standards for PLCs. KNICS decided to use FBD as a standard representation of software design, because it can visually expresses controller behavior as interconnected operation of function blocks. It is common for FBD engineers to develop it manually from requirements specification and to revise it frequently to reflect new or modified requirements in process of development.

Safety demonstration is the most important quality aspect that must be rigorously demonstrated throughout entire life-cycle phases of safety-critical software systems. Therefore all modifications made to FBDs require safety demonstration. RPS software of APR-1400 advanced nuclear power reactor, in development in Korea, is such an example. While inspection technique is useful, it alone is inadequate to meet rigorous regulatory requirements. This paper proposes a software verification framework for FBD software used in nuclear power plant’s reactor protection systems.

The software verification framework uses two different verification techniques to verify FBD software thoroughly. It uses Cadence SMV model checker [10] for verifying whether an FBD meets its required properties, and also uses VIS verification system [11] for checking behavioral equivalence between subsequently modified FBDs. For these we first translate FBD programs into Verilog [12] programs according to the translation rules proposed in [13, 14] and using automatic translation program we developed in [26].
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces background information on FBD programming, Verilog, SMV model checking, and VIS equivalence checking. Section 3 shows the software verification framework for FBD software in nuclear power plants. Application of the proposed technique is demonstrated in Section 4. Section 5 presents related work, and we conclude the paper at Section 6.

2. Background
2.1. FBD Programming in PLC

Programmable Logic Controller (PLC), widely used in real-time and embedded control applications [16], has relatively simple architecture. Sensors and actuators are plugged in via input and output channels, respectively. Operating system manages periodic execution of PLC applications by reading all input values at the beginning of each execution cycle and updating values of system variables. It then performs predefined computation and generates output values at the end of the cycle. Simplified architecture and processing mechanism make PLC an attractive platform for implementing embedded application software, i.e. chemical processing plants, nuclear power plants and traffic control systems.

2.2. Verilog

Verilog [12] is one of the most popular HDL (Hardware Description Language) used by IC (Integrated Circuit) designers. Verilog allows software design to be simulated earlier in design cycle to correct errors and experiment with different hardware architecture. Several characteristics of Verilog make it possible to use it easily in software design too. Procedural assignment statements, module and function calls, and the manner of I/O of Verilog are very similar to those of C++/C, basic software design languages. These characteristics make software engineers who design and verify FBD programs feel more comfortable with learning and training. Software engineers familiar with procedural programming.

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2 The FBD in Fig. 2 was developed using Concept ver. 2.2 XL SR2, a PLC programming assistant tool marketed by Schneider Automation GmbH.
languages like C/C++ can use the Verilog without much effort. It is one of major advantage of Verilog compared to other HDLs.

2.3. SMV Model Checking

The proposed verification framework uses model checking technique to verify FBD programs formally. Model checking is a technique to prove whether a formal specification satisfies required properties or not. Cadence SMV [10] is a model checker based on symbolic model checking technique [17]. It can verify a model programmed in Synchronous Verilog (SV) [18], a slight variation of the Verilog language with cycle-based behavior. Cadence SMV’s vl2smv function converts the Synchronous Verilog into SMV input language, and then performs model checking. True is returned if Verilog model meets given properties, otherwise, a counter-example is produced to demonstrate the existence of errors in the Verilog model.

2.4. VIS Equivalence Checking

VIS (Verification Interacting with Synthesis) [11] is a tool that integrates verification, simulation and synthesis of finite state hardware system. It uses Verilog as a front end and supports fair Computational Tree Logic (CTL) model checking, language emptiness checking, combinational and sequential equivalence checking, cycle-based simulation, and hierarchical synthesis. As VIS has the capability to interface with SIS [19] to optimize logic modules, it is an integrated system for hierarchical synthesis as well as verification. More detailed introduction to its structure and functions goes out of scope, so we introduce equivalence checking briefly what we concern in this paper.

VIS provides the capability to test sequential and combinational equivalence of two designs. An important usage of combinational equivalence is to provide a sanity check for re-synthesizing portions of a combinational logic. Sequential equivalence checking is done by building the product of finite state machine, and checking whether a state where the values of two corresponding outputs differ can be reached from the set of initial states of the product machine. If this happens, a debug trace is provided. Unfortunately, VIS has no graphical UI support yet.

3. A Verification Framework

This section introduces a software verification framework for FBD software in nuclear power plant’s reactor protection system. A typical safety-critical system, RPS in APR-1400 advanced power reactor, is being developed and implemented on PLCs by KNICS project. Its whole software development process is described in Fig.3. Details are introduced in [20, 14].

![Figure 3. A software development process for KNCIS’s APR-1400 RPS](image)

In the software development process for APR-1400 RPS, software requirements are derived from an informal natural language specification first and then rewritten in NuSCR formal specification language [4]. Formal specification mandates developers to specify all requirements explicitly and completely without any assumptions or omissions, so use of formal specification is strongly recommended by government authorities like KINS [24]. A formal verification, model checking was performed on NuSCR formal specification to verify important properties as presented in [21].

In design phase, FBD programs are manually developed by FBD engineers from the requirement specification. A synthesis technique proposed in [22] could support mechanical synthesis of FBD programs from NuSCR formal specification, but its lack of automatic tool-support made it difficult to be used in the development process.

In implementation phase, an engineering tool named pSET [15] translates FBD programs into executable codes for PLC. The engineering tool also generates intermediate C code for testing purposes. There is our on-going research on direct FBD testing [25]. PLC-based software development is finished when FBD program has been adequately tested using the generated C code.

Initial FBD design is revised when additional requirements are introduced or optimization is performed to avoid redundant implementation. Although FBD modifications might be minor in scope, they might still give rise to subtle behavioral changes and result in safety critical errors. Therefore, one must
always demonstrate that required behavior is preserved as illustrated in Fig.4. The proposed verification framework depicted in Fig.4 uses two different formal verification techniques. While VIS verification system can check behavioral equivalence of subsequently modified FBD programs, SMV model checker verifies the FBD program whether it satisfies properties or not. These different verification techniques works together to demonstrate safety of the final FBD program, FBDN.

3.1. VIS Equivalence Checking

The verification framework uses VIS’s equivalence checking to preserve behavioral equivalence between subsequently modified FBD programs. For this purpose, first we translate FBDs into equivalent Verilog programs, and perform equivalence checking using VIS as described in Fig.5 below.

FBD programs are stored in .ld format in the engineering tool pSET, and FBD Verifier 1.0 [26] we developed translates them into equivalent Verilog programs in .v format. As VIS verification system has no graphical user interface, we execute the VIS in Cygwin environment and check their equivalence. A program named vl2mv [27] in VIS verification system translates Verilog program in .v into .mv format which VIS can read and analyze.

If any “NOT equivalence” occurs, VIS shows a counter example describing the situation - sequences of changed value of variables. Up to now, we analyze the counter-examples manually with FBD engineers to find a precise cause of the not equivalence. However, the automation and visualization of VIS analysis on which we are currently focusing will promote efficiency of the manual analysis.

3.2. SMV Model Checking

SMV model checking in the verification framework verifies Verilog program translated from FBD program whether it satisfies important properties or not. FBD Verifier 1.1 reads FBD programs in .ld format and translates them into Verilog programs in .v format. FBD Verifier 1.1 also translates the Verilog program into SMV input program (.smv) automatically using vl2smv program in Cadence SMV. Fig.6 describes the SMV model checking process in the framework.

Properties to be checked are written in LTL formula within translated Verilog programs. The Cadence SMV returns TRUE if Verilog meets give properties, otherwise, returns a counter- example. In addition to translation function, FBD Verifier 1.1 also supports analysis of counter examples by visualizing graphically changing status of variables [26].

4. Case Study

We applied the proposed verification technique to APR-1400 RPS [23] which is being developed in Korea. The RPS is composed of Bistable Processor (BP) and Coincidence Processor (CP). While we applied VIS equivalence checking to a part of BP, we
applied SMV model checking to whole FBDs of RPS BP and CP.

4.1. VIS Equivalence Checking

VIS Equivalence checking aims for verifying behavioral equivalence between two different FBDs. Therefore, there is no official experimental result left for demonstrating its usefulness, unfortunately. VIS’s non-graphical interface also made it difficult for FBD engineers to use the technique easily and efficiently. In spite of its lack of official experimental result, VIS equivalence checking technique’s usefulness was well recognized by domain engineers.

In this subsection, we introduce some experiments on early version of BP FBDs, Rev.00 draft [36]. The VIS equivalence checking technique was originally developed for the purpose of supporting FBD synthesis technique proposed in [22]. We could synthesize FBDs mechanically from NuSCR formal specification, but it was not applied to the actual development of RPS yet. No automatic tool support for the FBD synthesis technique was a huge obstacle to apply it in earnest. Therefore, there were two kinds of FBDs, manually developed FBDs and mechanically synthesized FBDs, from the same NuSCR formal requirements specification. Fig.7 depicts an FBD which was synthesized mechanically from the same NuSCR requirement specification as the manually developed FBD depicted in Fig.2. The FBD in Fig.2 is an optimized one which was manually modified by domain experts. While the mechanically synthesized FBD in Fig.7 is composed of 15 function blocks, the optimized FBD in Fig.2 has only 7 function blocks.

As VIS counter-example does not show the different output values explicitly in final state, we must use simulation facility of VIS to investigate the cause more precisely and fix the errors. We are expecting that the VIS analysis supporting tool which we are currently focusing will solve the inefficiency and inconvenience well. Details are beyond the scope of this paper, but domain engineers found an error in the position of TOF function block, and modified it as shown in Fig.9. VIS equivalence checking proved that these two FBDs have the same behavior.
We applied the VIS equivalence checking to several kinds of trip (shutdown of nuclear reactor) logic in RPS BP, early version of BP FBDs Rev.00 draft [36], and Table 1 depicts the result. We, surprisingly, found several critical logic errors in both the manual and synthesized FBDs. Such errors might be difficult to detect using other techniques such as testing or inspection, and later releases of specification were corrected. Domain engineers felt that FBD verification made an important contribution in ensuring safety of PRS implementation.

TABLE 1. VIS equivalence checking result for parts of BP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trip Logic for BP</th>
<th>Error Type</th>
<th>Mechanically Synthesized FBDs</th>
<th>Manually Developed FBDs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fixed set-point rising trip without operating bypass</td>
<td>Syntax</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Logic</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual reset variable set-point trip with operating bypass</td>
<td>Syntax</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Logic</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.2. SMV Model Checking

In contrast to VIS equivalence checking, we applied SMV model checking to the whole RPS BP and CP, FBD Rev.02 [23]. Table 2 describes their size and complexity. We used Cadence SMV model checker to verify whether the Verilog program meets important properties or not. FBD Verifier 1.1 translates FBD programs (.ld) in pSET into Verilog programs (.v), and then executes vl2smv function in Cadence SMV to translate it into SMV input programs (.smv). FBD Verifier 1.1 also executes Cadence SMV automatically using the translated SMV programs as inputs. Properties to be verified for RPS were developed by cooperation of nuclear engineers and software engineering engineers. Domain experts provided important properties specified in natural language, and software engineering engineers encoded them into proper logical expressions. These properties belong to safety properties which can be specified with LTL easily as classified in Table 3.

TABLE 2. RPS system information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>System</th>
<th># of pages of requirements specification (Natural lang.)</th>
<th># of function blocks</th>
<th># of variables</th>
<th># of lines in Verilog model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BP</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>1,335</td>
<td>1,038</td>
<td>7,862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>1,623</td>
<td>820</td>
<td>3,085</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 3. Examples of verification properties for RPS BP and CP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Properties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>When the trip condition is satisfied, a trip should occur.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>When the trip release condition is satisfied, a trip should release.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Trip set-point value should be in valid range.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>When trip and pretrip did not occur, trip set-point and pretrip set-point should keep the specified difference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>When the processing value is in invalid range, a range error should occur.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>When the heartbeat of the other system is unsound, a heartbeat error should occur.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We verified the BP thoroughly with suggested properties by domain engineers depicted in Table 3, and as a result, 47 errors were found. With the exclusion of repeated errors with the same cause, 10 distinct errors were found. In addition to the BP system, we also verified the CP successfully. Table 4 summarizes the verification result. Detailed analysis of the verification result is beyond the scope of this paper [37], but it is worth to introduce typical causes of errors analyzed from the verification result.

TABLE 4. Verification result for RPS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>System</th>
<th>BP</th>
<th>CP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td># of Properties</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Found Errors</td>
<td>Incorrect Logic</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Omission</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ambiguous Logic</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Incorrect FBD</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Incorrect Design</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total # of Errors</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinct # of Errors</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Typical causes of errors in RPS system were as follows: misused variable name (e.g. use of TRIP_LOGIC variable instead of _TRIP_LOGIC variable), misused operator (e.g. use of >= instead of >), omitted range check, undetermined values at initial phase, unmatched specification between natural language specification and FBDs, and not removed temporary test logic. Most of these errors had not been detected with other activities such as inspection, traceability analysis, and safety analysis. We reported found errors to RPS developing engineers, and they were satisfied with the verification result and modified the RPS program based on our verification result. Topical report for the RPS was submitted to the regulation authority KINS in order to get safety approval and the approval result is about to come out.
5. Related Work

In recent years, demand for PLC program verification on safety has been growing. Several research projects addressed FBD verification issues, and [16, 28] provide surveys on verification of PLC programming languages LD and ST.

[29] used higher order logic (HOL) to model specifications and implementations. Function blocks are modeled as relations on streams. According to the framework, there are no restrictions on data type, and time is treated implicitly on the contrary to the Verilog and VIS verification system. However, proofs are done with help of a theorem prover, Isabelle/HOL system [30], and it costs too much in comparison with automatic verification using VIS.

IEC 61499 [31] defined interactions between controllers and overall systems (plants) using FBDs, and [32] formalized it with Single-Net Systems (SNS) [33] model. The controller code is defined in FBD format and the overall system is organized in IEC 61499 function blocks. In this approach, the complete structure is automatically translated into Single-Net Systems (SNS) model using a tool, VEDA. On the combined model of plant and controller, model checking is performed using SESA (Signal/Event System Analyzer) [34].

In [35], a toolset called PLCTOOLS has been introduced. The FBD programs are modeled and described as High Level Timed Petri Nets (HLPTN), and HLTPN are used for validating the design and generating the code. MATLAB/SIMULINK provides means for specifying and simulating plants. PLCTOOLS focuses on designing, simulation, and PLC code generation, not formal verification.

6. Conclusion and Future Work

This paper proposed a verification framework for FBD-based software in nuclear power plant’s reactor protection systems. Proposed framework suggests two different formal verification techniques, Cadence SMV model checker for verifying whether an FBD meets its required properties and VIS verification system for checking behavioral equivalence between subsequently modified FBDs. They work together to demonstrate safety of FBD programs.

We verified FBDs for KNICS APR-1400 RPS with proposed verification framework. A number of FBDs could be verified and analyzed effectively, and the verification result was successfully applied to official releases of FBDs. We are also currently focusing on developing VIS analysis automation tool for visualizing VIS equivalence checking process and result more efficiently. We have a plan to apply the proposed verification framework to other safety-critical systems too.

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